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1 
OPERATIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY:  
THE CASE OF TORONTO’S WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW 
 




In 2017, Justin Trudeau, Canada’s optimistic and youthful Prime Minister, made unprecedented 
remarks in a room full of municipal leaders: “We know our country is only as strong as the 
towns and cities we’re made of. We’re only as strong as our rec centres and social housing, our 
wastewater and public transit. We heard you when you said you needed a strong partner in 
Ottawa.”2 These phrases suggest that municipalities have a direct government-to-government 
relationship with the federal government. But the remarks lie in stark contrast to the tattered 150-
year-old pages of the Constitution Act, 1867,3 where a city or town can do whatever the province 
empowers them to do, but not more.4 This paper focuses on these contrasting messages of 
municipal authority, which I argue continue to be muddied in Canada. I reflect the potential of a 
particular legal principle – subsidiarity – to resolve these contrasting messages when it comes to 
the design of provincial legislation. 
 
Until the 1990s, the judiciary endorsed unilateral provincial acts like amalgamations without 
requiring municipal consent and upheld a narrow interpretation of municipal action.5 Since then, 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has gradually invoked a broader interpretation of municipal 
action. One of the tools of interpretation adopted by the SCC was the principle of subsidiarity, a 
 
1 I am grateful to the many wise colleagues who assisted me in crafting this piece, particularly Hoi Kong, Stepan 
Wood, Richard Briffault, and Kellan Zale. I am also deeply indebted to the Osgoode Hall Law Journal’s thoughtful 
anonymous reviewers for their detailed and wise observations. Many thanks also to the participants at various 
conferences where the arguments in this paper were raised. All errors and omissions are my own.  
2 FCM Media, “Prime Minister highlights nation-building partnership with Canada’s local governments,” Federation 
of Canadian Municipalities (2 June 2017). 
3 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
4 Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status” 
(2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 409 at 418-19. 
5 Stanley Makuch, Neil Craik & Signe B. Leisk, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2004) at 82. 
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notion borrowed from the European Union, which advocates that decisions be made at the lowest 
level of government appropriate and possible. The aim of this principle is to guarantee a degree 
of independence for a local authority in relation to a higher body or central government, to 
ensure that powers are exercised closest to citizens. In Canada, the courts are clear that the notion 
of subsidiarity cannot contradict the Constitution, meaning that municipal action must be read in 
light of the powers granted to municipalities by provinces. However, subsidiarity alerts us to 
another way of understanding municipal power: as a principle that understands the municipality 
as a government, with broad authority to make decisions for their constituents.  
 
This paper analyzes what the principle of subsidiarity means for municipalities, arguing in favour 
of “operative subsidiarity” in the design of provincial legislation. First, I outline the meaning and 
origins of subsidiarity, including critiques in the potential of its application. Second, I discuss the 
judicial treatment of municipal authority in Canada over the last twenty years. I advance that 
municipal authority as interpreted by the SCC has increasingly made room for municipalities as 
governments deserving of deference, unless the action breaches fairness or human rights. 
However, despite this judicial evolution, provinces have not drafted legislation with the principle 
of subsidiarity in mind, leading to unintended consequences as a result of the interplay between 
laws. This means that while municipalities, especially cities, are asserting a stronger role in 
national debates, a complex reading of multiple laws mires their ability to act and ultimately 
complicates decisions once made.  
 
To animate the state of municipal authority, I next focus on Toronto’s ward boundary review 
(WBR), which began in 2013 by City Council resolution, concluded in 2018 following quasi-
judicial involvement, and was then overturned, in the middle of the city’s election, by provincial 
legislation shortly afterwards. The WBR was the first electoral boundary review undertaken by 
the City of Toronto since the enactment of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (“COTA”), whereby 
Toronto was granted increased decision-making power, including the design of its electoral 
model and boundaries. Despite this purported independence, the city’s WBR was hampered by 
two “bookends” of provincial constraints: limits to its delegated powers under COTA and 
constraints imposed by Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) oversight. Even before the provincial 
government overturned the city’s chosen 47 ward model, Toronto’s WBR process was based on 
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mixed legislative messages, with a contradictory framework that left the city reactionary to 
provincial and OMB decisions. This section details the labourous provincial framework related 
to the drawing of ward boundaries and the eventual mid-election override of the city’s decision. 
 
The paper concludes with an explanation of how operative subsidiarity can help in reconciling 
multiple pieces of provincial legislation that conflict and confuse the scale of municipal 
authority. I draw from the work of Yishai Blank, who argues that subsidiarity, although messy 
and fragmented, offers a place for cities of divergent sizes and powers to assume authority, but 
necessitates thoughtful decisions on where power should rest, and from Hoi Kong, who also 
seeks to operationalize the principle.6 When applied to intra vires decisions, operative 
subsidiarity provides a means of evaluating whether provinces have adequately devolved power 
to the municipal scale. In the case of the ward boundary review, operative subsidiarity clarifies 
that the Province of Ontario’s decision to reconfigure the city’s wards mid-election was not a 
discrete action, but part of a larger legislative blackbox in relation to municipal decision-making 
and electoral districts. This article proposes that the principle of operative subsidiarity be applied 
to reconceptualize municipal authority to comply with the expansive principles espoused by 
courts and enable a consistent approach to provincial legislative design concerning municipal 
authority.  
 
II. The principle of subsidiarity and its implications for municipal authority  
 
Nicholas Blomley remarks that, “Jurisdictions are conceived as technical devices, sorting 
mechanisms that can be used to allocate people and objects to particular categories.”7 One of 
these sorting devices is the municipality.8 While early jurisprudence debated whether 
municipalities were to be considered governments or corporations under the law, it is now well-
established that municipal decisions are subject to review per the Charter of Rights and 
 
6 In this article, “municipal” or “city” means the one or more statutes that give corporate entities their powers. The 
term “city” is, in statutory terms in Ontario, undefined. The most recent set of municipal statutes removed references 
to titles like “city,” “town” and “village” (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 at s. 457(1)).  
7 Nicholas Blomley “What sort of a legal space is a city?” in Andrea Mubi Brighenti (ed.) Urban Interstices: The 
Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-between (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
8 While this article focuses on the municipal, provincial and federal scales, please note that the principle of 
subsidiarity has been invoked to argue that the neighbourhood should be granted legal power in decision-making. 
See e.g. Frug, Gerald E. “Decentering Decentralization” (1993) 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 253. 
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Freedoms.9 Courts in particular have interpreted the provisions of provincial legislation as 
enabling municipalities to function as governments based on powers delegated from the 
provincial legislatures, and have held that municipalities must be able to govern based on the 
best interests of their residents and conceptions of the public good.10  
 
This recognition by the courts is echoed in the public domain. Cities and their mayors are 
increasingly important players within the country. In the case of Toronto, the country’s largest 
municipality, this importance is reflected in decisions of the federal government to transfer 
billions of dollars and empowering the city to make final spending decisions;11 political agency, 
whereby the provincial government refused to step in to remove Toronto’s mayor;12 and 
oversight, where the City successfully argued that more expansive provincial ombudsman 
powers should not apply to Toronto’s affairs.13 Scholars, including Ron Levi and Mariana 
Valverde, opined that this increasing recognition of municipal power by federal and provincial 
governments and the courts speaks to the power of local residents, in that municipalities have the 
ears, perhaps better than any other government, of the many people that reside within their 
boundaries.14  
 
9 See generally Robert G. Doumani and Jane Matthews Glenn, “Property, Planning and the Charter” (1989) 34 
McGill Law Journal 1036. Note Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto et al, (1983) 147 D. L. R. (3d) (Ont. S. C.), 
where Linden J. stated at 663, “Municipalities, though a distinct level of government for some purposes, have no 
constitutional status; they are merely “creatures of the legislature”, with no existence independent of the legislature 
or government of each province. Hence, just as the provincial legislatures and governments are bound by the 
Charter, so too are municipalities, whose by-laws and other actions must be considered, for the purposes of s. 32(1), 
as actions of the provincial government, which gave them birth.” See also Yishai Blank, “Localism in the New 
Global Legal Order” (2006) 47:1 Harvard Law Review 263; and David J. Barron, “A Localist Critique of the New 
Federalism” (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 377. 
10 Pacific National Investment Ltd. v. Victoria (City), 2000 CarswellBV 2439, 2000 CarswellBC 2441, [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 919, reconsideration/rehearing refused 2001 CarswellBC523, 2001 CarswellBC 524 (S.C.C.). 
11 See e.g. the Federal Gas Tax Fund, a federal infrastructure funding program that gives funding directly to 
municipalities, including $152 million per year to the City of Toronto (Government of Canada, “The Federal Gas 
Tax Fund: Permanent and Predictable Funding for Municipalities” (12 April 2017), online: 
<http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/plan/gtf-fte-eng.html>.  
12 Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Minister says stripping Ford of mayoralty powers was legal, appropriate” The Globe and Mail (19 
November 2013). 
13 In 2014, the Ontario Ombudsman proposed an expansion of their scope of powers to include oversight over 
municipal actions. Initially, this included the power to investigate Toronto decisions, but following this proposal was 
dropped following objections from the City of Toronto (see Adrian Morrow, “Ontario set to strengthen Ombudsman’s 
powers” Globe and Mail (6 March 2014), online: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ontario-set-to-strengthen-
watchdogs-powers/article17339860/> and Ontario Ombudsman, “Who we oversee: Municipalities” (17 April 2017), online: < 
https://www.ombudsman.on.ca/About-Us/Who-We-Oversee/Municipalities.aspx>. 
14 Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Streets: City Governance in an Age of Diversity (The University of 
Chicago Press, 2012). 
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The principle of subsidiarity is one way that scholars have made sense of local power. The roots 
of the term trace back to religious philosopher Thomas Aquinas, who asks fundamental questions 
about the relationship between the delegation of political power and the representation of civil 
society.15 Subsidiarity means, “the smallest possible social or political entities should have all the 
rights and powers they need to regulate their own affairs freely and effectively.”16 Peter Hogg 
describes subsidiarity as, “a principle of social organization that prescribes that decisions 
affecting individuals should, as far as possible, be made by the level of government closest to the 
individuals affected,”17 with the idea that government powers should always reside at the lowest 
level possible.18 We can conceive of subsidiarity as either negative, whereby the larger-scaled 
entity must not intervene when the smaller can manage its affairs on its own, or positive, where 
subsidiarity requires that a larger entity must be given explicit powers to accomplish its goals.19  
 
To Yishai Blank, federalism and subsidiarity advance competing versions of the state.20 He 
writes that each of these principles of government, “presents a different view of the state and its 
relationship with society; each manifests a distinct approach to the role of cities in the act of 
government; each advocates different sets of political identification and relationships among 
spheres of human existence; and each is organized through different legal principles, institutions 
and procedures.”21 Blank offers two distinctions between these principles. First, subsidiarity 
recognizes more than two jurisdictions (the central government and the province or state).22 In 
contrast, federalism “does not theorize cities,” leaving them as the responsibility of each 
individual province or state.23 Subsidiarity recognizes the “uniqueness of every social sphere and 
its place in the total social structure,” including villages and communities that pre-dated the 
 
15 Eugénie Brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora’s Box?” 
(2011) 54 Sup Ct L Rev 601 at 604. 
16 Ibid. at at 605. 
17 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 114. 
18 Yishai Blank, “Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel 
Governance” (2009) 37:2 Fordham Law Journal 510 at 533. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. at 522. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. at 533. 
23 Ibid. at 549. 
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creation of the state.24 Thus, the idea that power should reside at the “closest” level possible 
cannot be perceived in a technical or absolute manner; it is, instead, a substantive term that seeks 
to find the right ‘fit’ between the activity in question and the governing unit.25 Second, 
subsidiarity calls for a positive autonomy towards constituent units, whereas federalism asserts a 
negative autonomy, meaning that one governing unit should not interfere with the conduct of 
another.26 Subsidiarity does not focus on strict executive competencies in each jurisdiction.27 
Under subsidiarity, each unit should make its decisions without intervention, but it should be 
assisted by other units if needed to achieve the asserted goal.  
 
In essence, subsidiarity is a dynamic rather than a rigid principle that offers “a degree of 
flexibility to governance by striking a balance between respect for the diverse entities present 
and a level of state cohesion.”28 Subsidiarity is a more flexible legal principle that accommodates 
the involvement of multiple scales in decision-making.29 To Blank, subsidiarity is messy and 
fragmented, offering a place for cities of divergent sizes and powers to assume authority for 
matters like housing and homelessness, which federalism struggles to accommodate.30 This 
notion of subsidiarity also has echoes in Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ notion of scale. Santos 
stated that “laws are maps; written laws are cartographic maps; customary, informal laws are 
mental maps.”31 Santos offers an analogy between maps and law by distinguishing between 
“large scale” and “small scale.” A large-scale map shows less land but far more detail (“a 
miniaturized version of reality”) and small-scale more land, showing relative positions, but 
ultimately less detail.32 Scale differs in its presentation of detail or relative positions, and it may 
“zoom in” on particular phenomena. Scale is relevant in how law is crafted as “laws use different 
criteria to determine the meaningful details and the relevant features of the activity to be 
regulated.”33 Municipal action is, in a sense, a “zooming in” on a localized area. The scale is the 
 
24 Ibid. at 541. 
25 Ibid. at 542. 
26 Ibid. at 542. 
27 Ibid. at 533. 
28 Brouillet, supra note 15 at 606. 
29 Frug, supra note 8. 
30 Blank, supra note 18 at 546. 
31 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading – Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law” (1987) 14 
J.L. & Soc’y 281 at 282. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
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zoomed-in city, enabling a more careful consideration of the policies and decisions that affect a 
localized area. Subsidiarity acts as a legal principle to include this scale in its decision-making 
model but recognizes that the subject matter of this more careful focus may extend beyond the 
enumerated powers that a province grants a municipality.  
 
A main critique of the principle of subsidiarity is the difficulty in its application.34 Alain 
Delcamp states: “[i]t is evident that the notion of subsidiarity is unfocused and cannot itself, 
except with great difficulty, generate legal effects.”35 To Delcamp, the dynamic nature of 
subsidiarity means that there are many arguments as to which localized institutions and 
boundaries are the idealized sites for decision-making and how (and when) they can be 
empowered to act (and when), including scales within and beyond the municipality, such as 
neighbourhoods.36 The rationality of subsidiarity both enables localized governance, yet the lack 
of precision in the specific roles of formal units of governance leads to confusion in as to how to 
rightly apply the principle. Blank is more optimistic about its normative potential, citing as an 
example the Lisbon Treaty, which mentions the importance of consultation at the local level in 
order to advance the principle of subsidiarity.37 This, he argues, leaves open the possibility that 
the dynamic, flexible nature of subsidiarity can lead to specific outcomes. Some scholars suggest 
 
34 Note the other main area of critique, including the appropriateness of subsidiarity in light of rule of law, human 
rights, judicial review, and public choice (see e.g. George A. Bermann, “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism 
in the European Community and the United States” (1994) 94:2 Columbia Law Review 331-456 (whether the 
principle of subsidiarity is justiciable); Daniel T. Murphy, “Subsidiarity and/or Human Rights” 1994) 29 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 67 and Dinah Shelton, “Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human Rights” in Donna Gomien, ed. Broadening the 
Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide (1993) at 43 (concerns regarding subsidiarity and 
adequate protection of human rights); Paolo G. Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law” (2003) 97:1 The American Journal of International Law 38-79 and W. Skillen & Rockne M. 
McCarthy, “Three Views of Social Pluralism: A Critical Evaluation” in James W. Skillen & Rockne M. McCarthy 
eds., Political Order and the Plural Structure of Society (1991) at 357 (subsidiarity as a paradoxical principle that 
both limits yet empowers and justifies the state); Rodolfo Sacco, “Diversity and Uniformity in the Law: (2001) 49 
AM.J. COMP. L. 171 (subsidiarity’s potential to reduce the consistency and uniformity of the law); and Steven G. 
Calabresi and Lucy D. Bickford, “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitution” (2014) 55 
Nomos 123-189 and Vicki C. Jackson, “Subsidiarity, the Judicial Role, and the Warren Court's Contribution to the 
Revival of State Government” (2014) 55 Nomos 190-213 (whether or not subsidiarity is linked to economics and 
externalities). These and other critiques regarding subsidiarity are not addressed here given the scope of this paper. 
35 Alain Delcamp, “Principe de subsidiarité et décentralisation” (1993) 23 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 
609 at 623, translated in Brouillet, supra note 15. 
36 Frug, supra note 8. 
37 Title I, Article 3b of the Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, Dec 13, 2007 OJ (C306) 50 states: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do 
not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at the central level or at regional and local level, 
but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at the Union level.” 
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that even where subsidiarity is codified, it may be non-justiciable.38 However, in some 
jurisdictions, codification then prevents interference; for example, in South Africa national or 
provincial laws only prevail over the municipality where they do not “compromise or impede a 
municipality's ability or right to exercise.”39 
 
Given the normative aims of this present paper, I turn to Kong’s characterization of the Canadian 
federalism, which he asserts was “structured to safeguard a set of collective interests.”40 Kong 
states: “When the activities that constitute a nation (including activities tied to the creation of a 
common public culture) and the goods that flow from these activities (including goods relating to 
the individual autonomy of group members) require state institutions that are controlled by 
members of the nation, nations can make a plausible claim to a measure of self-government.” In 
Kong’s view, subsidiarity can be incorporated into Canadian federalism.41 To Kong, subsidiarity 
serves as a means to limit the federal government’s autonomy and to require deliberation rather 
than unilateral decision-making.42 Put another way, subsidiarity tempers top-down state 
autonomy by acknowledging that its decisions affect other scales of government.43  
 
Building on Kong’s account, I suggest that the subsidiarity can be operationalized to address the 
reality of multiple scales of government action. I advance the notion of “operative subsidiarity,” 
which means that the provincial government would first look to the policy area to be addressed, 
prior to determining the appropriate scale, and then “each and every service, function, or 
responsibility needs to be thought of afresh.”44 As Berman writes, “[A] subsidiarity regime does 
not pose an outright bar to governance at the ‘higher’ level of authority. But it does not offer a 
blank check either. The idea is to foster careful and repeated consideration of other potential 
lawmaking communities.”45 While the principle of subsidiarity accepts that there will likely be 
 
38 Clayton P. Gillette, “The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments” (1997) 83:7 Virginia Law Review 
1347. 
39 Nico Steytler, “The powers of local government in decentralised systems of government: managing the 'curse of 
common competencies'” (2005) 38:2 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 271 at 283. 
40 Hoi Kong, “Subsidiarity, Republicanism and the Division of Powers in Canada” (2015) 45  Revue de droit de 
l’Université de Sherbrooke 13 at 26. 
41 Ibid. at 30. 
42 Ibid. at 35. 
43 Ibid. at 37. 
44 Blank, supra note 18 at 536. 
45 Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 1155 at 1208. 
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intergovernmental approaches, it assumes that primary policy empowerment will be placed at the 
scale of a particular government.46 It is not a presumption that the local government is always 
equipped or appropriate to oversee every policy area that touches a municipality; instead, there 
must be an assessment taken based on the needs and resources in question.47  
 
I argue that operative subsidiarity is a standard that allows us to ask whether a provincial 
government has decided on the appropriate government scale of policy action and has then 
ensured that all other provincial legislation permits the government to fully act. Subsidiarity 
offers a lens by which all provincial legislation can be assessed, based on how it works together, 
as to whether or not a local government has been given the authority to act.48 In dissent in 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Supreme Court of Canada Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps wrote, “this is where the principle of subsidiarity could apply, not as an independent 
basis for the distribution of legislative powers, but as an interpretive principle [.]”49 What differs 
in this account is that operative subsidiarity may provide a basis for understanding how 
provincial legislative design affects the exercise of municipal power; not just in one empowering 
statute, but across all legislation that affects the local government. Before setting out the case of 
Toronto’s ward boundaries, which provides a fulsome illustration of the potential application of 
operative subsidiarity, the next section sets out judicial treatment of municipal authority.   
 
II. Judicial interpretation of municipal authority 
 
The Legal Authority of Municipalities under the Constitution 
 
The legal story of municipal power continues to evolve in Canada. In this story, the courts play a 
fundamental role. Under section 92(8) of the Constitution, municipal status and jurisdiction are 
crystal clear: “Municipal institutions” are within the province’s exclusive authority and have no 
protection against changes imposed on them by provinces.50 It is this constitutional luminosity 
 
46 Blank, supra note 18 at 557. 
47 Berman, supra note 45 at 1209. 
48 Jacob T. Levy, “Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties” (2007) 101:3 The American Political 
Science Review 459 at 462. 
49 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra note 41 at paras 192–93. 
50 Makuch et al., supra note 5 at 81. 
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that have led municipalities to be called “creatures of the province,” with provincial governments 
empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot do.51 This means that the 
review of government decisions looks very different for municipalities than their federal or 
provincial counterparts; municipalities are “entities with a defined jurisdictional sphere, are 
required to act within their appointed jurisdictional limits, and failure to do so may result in the 
courts quashing the municipal action as ultra vires, or beyond its legal competence.”52  
 
The interpretation of Canadian municipal power can be traced to the origins of municipalities 
under English law, which were not designed as democratically accountable.53 Their place within 
Canada’s federal fabric was also framed by a nineteenth-century doctrine of municipal authority 
known as “Dillon’s Rule,” which resulted in the first comprehensive municipal act. Dillon’s rule 
refers to the framework established by John Dillion, an American jurist who objected to 
“municipal largesse and waste.”54 Under this doctrine of “prescribed powers,” municipalities can 
act only when expressly authorized by statute, which is to be interpreted narrowly.55 Dillon’s rule 
suggests a relationship between municipalities and provinces like that of a parent and child, with 
provinces keeping a “watchful eye” on how municipal powers are exercised in concern that they 
will be inappropriately used.56 On a practical level, it means that municipal authority may not be 
exercised unless a province grants these governments the power to do so, although this authority 
can be implicit.57 The SCC referenced Dillon’s Rule most recently in 1993 in R. v. Greenbaum, a 
case involving a street vendor who was unable to receive a permit to sell t-shirts on Toronto 
streets as a result of a city by-law. In critiquing the city’s exercise of unauthorized power, Justice 
Iacobucci stated in R. v. Greenbaum: “The courts, as a result of this inferior legal position [of 
municipalities], have traditionally interpreted narrowly statutes respecting grants of powers to 
municipalities. This approach may be described as 'Dillon's rule,' which states that a municipality 
may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily or fairly 
 
51 Levi & Valverde, supra note 4 at 416. 
52 Makuch et al., supra note 5 at 81. 
53 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 3-5; 
Makuch et al., supra note 5 at 82. 
54 Ibid. at 418-19 (Dillon’s rule emerged in reaction to municipalities incurring massive debts to finance public 
improvements). 
55 Ibid. at 416. See also Makuch et al., supra note 5 at 82. 
56 Eugene Q.C., Meehan, Robert, Chiarelli & Marie-France, Major, “The Constitutional Legal Status of 
Municipalities 1849-2004: Success Is a Journey, but Also a Destination” (2007) 22 Nat'l J. Const. L. 1 at 5. 
57 R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674 at 688-689. 
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implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable powers essential and not 
merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes of the corporation.”58  
 
Although cities are left out of the Constitution as a level of government,59 the interpretation by 
the courts of municipal power has evolved.60 In 1997, the notion of cities as “creatures of the 
province” was fervently articulated in the decision of the Ontario Superior Court in East York v. 
Ontario (Attorney General). 61 This case challenged the unilateral decision of the Province of 
Ontario to amalgamate one regional and six lower-tier municipalities into the Toronto megacity 
in 1998 without consent of the affected municipalities. While referencing the lack of evidence of 
consultation and the vast number of people who voted against the amalgamation in locally-held 
referendums, the Superior Court concluded that the unilateral action did not exceed the 
province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to municipal institutions in the province. 
The court determined that the power to restructure Toronto is within provincial authority under 
the Constitution Act and set out four “clear” principles regarding the constitutional status of 
Canadian cities:62 
 
(i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status; 
(ii) municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial 
legislation so provides; 
(iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are subject to 
abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and 
(iv) municipal institutions may exercise only those powers which should be that which are 
conferred upon them by statute.  
 
In contrast to these “clear” principles, there is more nuance when it comes to the interpretation of 
the intra vires actions taken by local governments. In Shell Canada Products, the SCC 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 See e.g. Daniel Weistock, “Federalism and Cities” in James E. Sterling and Jacob T. Levy (eds), Federalism and 
Subsidiarity (New York; New York University Press, 2015) at 259-287. 
60 Morton v. British Columbia (Agriculture and Lands), 2009 BCSC 136 (CanLII), [2009] 7 WWR 690; 92 BCLR 
(4th) 314; 42 CELR (3d) 79; [2009] BCJ No 193 (QL); 174 ACWS (3d) 103 at para. 107. 
61 (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 789 (Gen. Div.), aff'd (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 733 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. vii. 
62 Ibid. at 797-98. 
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considered the proper interpretation of municipal power.63 This case concerned the City of 
Vancouver, who resolved not to do business with Shell, relying on an omnibus provision to 
justify the action. In Shell, the dispute between the justices was not based on the proper 
construction of municipal powers, but instead the purpose of the municipality. The majority 
ruled against the City of Vancouver based on the view that the impugned resolutions were not 
passed for a municipal purpose, not because it preferred a narrow construction over a broad and 
purposive interpretation. The majority held that the city did not have the authority to make such a 
decision. However, the case included a strong dissent authored by Justice McLachlin (as she then 
was), who argued in favour of judicial deference for elected municipal bodies on the democratic 
basis that their purpose is to serve the people who elected them.64 Justice McLachlin rooted her 
argument in the proposition that the construction of statutes relating to municipal authority 
should be subject to a more expansive interpretation, stating, “If municipalities are to be able to 
respond to the needs and wishes of their citizens, they must be given a broad jurisdiction to make 
local decisions reflecting local values.”65  
 
A short time later, Justice McLachlin’s dissent would be reflected in a two majority decisions, 
Rascal Trucking66 and Spraytech.67 In the 2001 Spraytech decision, the SCC again considered 
whether a municipal by-law that restricted the use of pesticides was ultra vires, or beyond the 
authority of a local government. In Spraytech,68 the Court allowed the town of Hudson, Quebec 
to ban the use of aesthetic pesticides, although considered non-toxic by provincial and federal 
regulators.69 The SCC considered whether the “impossibility of dual compliance” should be the 
test used to determine whether a municipal bylaw could be complied with alongside empowering 
legislation. This test establishes that provincial legislation should not be deemed to be 
 
63 Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), 1994 CanLII 115 (SCC), 1994 CanLII 115 (SCC), [1994] 1 
S.C.R. 231, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 244 [hereinafter “Shell”]. 
64 Ibid. See also Horton v. Greater Sudbury (City of), 2003 CanLII 34162 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/616m>, 
retrieved on 2018-04-16 at para. 26. 
65 Ibid. at 32. 
66 Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2000 SCC 13 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342 [hereinafter “Rascal 
Trucking”]. 
67 114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 [hereinafter 
“Spraytech”]. 
68Ibid. 
69 Ian M., Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 2d ed., Looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1971); 
quoted in Spraytech, supra note 64 at 258-59. 
Full citation: Alexandra Flynn, “Operative Subsidiary and Municipal Authority: the Case of Toronto’s Ward 
Boundary Review” (2019) 16:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 272, available here 
13 
inoperative simply because it legislates in the same area as another government.70 In framing 
municipalities and their authority, the SCC stated that “municipalities as statutory bodies may 
exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily or fairly 
implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable powers essential and not 
merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes of the corporation.”71 However, the SCC 
acknowledged the important representative role of local governments: “Whatever rules of 
construction are applied they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of municipal bodies as 
community representatives.”72 The SCC also stated that municipalities “balance complex and 
divergent interests” in decision-making, thus warranting that “intra vires decisions of 
municipalities be reviewed upon a deferential standard.”73 
 
Later, the SCC considered the right of a city to issue and regulate taxi plate licences. In this case, 
there was no explicit reference in the enabling legislation, and the City was accused of holding a 
position that was discriminatory and a breach of Charter rights.74 Justice Bastarache noted the 
shift in the interpretation of municipal authority by the courts, stating: “The “benevolent” and 
“strict” construction dichotomy has been set aside, and a broad and purposive approach to the 
interpretation of municipal powers has been embraced.”75 Similarly, in Croplife, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal adopted an expansive interpretation of municipal authority, stating that general 
welfare powers “are to be interpreted broadly and generously within their context and statutory 
limits to achieve the legitimate interests of the municipality and its inhabitants”.76 The court 
signaled a shift away from the traditionally restrictive, prescribed approach to the interpretation 
of municipal power in favour of a broad purposive approach.77 As held in R. v. Guignard: “This 
Court has often reiterated the social and political importance of local governments.  It has 
 
70 British Columbia Lottery Corp. v. City of Vancouver, 1999 BCCA 18 (CanLII),  169 D.L.R. (4th) 141, at pp. 147-
48. See also Ontario v. City of Mississauga (1981), 1981 CanLII 1860 (ON CA), 15 M.P.L.R. 212, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 
385 at 232. 
71 Spraytech, supra note 67. 
72 Ibid at para. 23. 
73 Rascal Trucking, supra note 66 at para. 35.  
74 United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19 (CanLII), 2004 S.C.C. 
19, referenced in R. v. Latouche, 2010 ABPC 166 (CanLII) at para. 72.  
75 Ibid. at para. 6. 
76 Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City), 2005 CarswellOnt 1877; 10 M.P.L.R (4th) 1 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, 
2005 CarswellOnt 6587. 
77 Galganov v. Russell (Township), 2012 ONCA 409, 99 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, leave to appeal refused 2012 CarswellOnt 
15189, 2012 CarswellOnt 15190 (S.C.C.). 
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stressed that their powers must be given a generous interpretation because their closeness to the 
members of the public who live or work on their territory make them more sensitive to the 
problems experienced by those individuals.”78 
  
Recently, in Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, the SCC was unwavering that the Constitution is 
to be applied with the principle of “co-operative federalism” with a clear place for 
municipalities. The SCC explained co-operative federalism as follows: “The division of powers, 
one of the basic components of federalism, was designed to uphold … diversity within a single 
nation. Broad powers were conferred on provincial legislatures, while at the same time Canada's 
unity was ensured by reserving to Parliament powers better exercised in relation to the country as 
a whole. Each head of power was assigned to the level of government best placed to exercise the 
power. The fundamental objectives of federalism were, and still are, to reconcile unity with 
diversity, promote democratic participation by reserving meaningful powers to the local or 
regional level and to foster co-operation among governments and legislatures for the common 
good.”79 The case established that municipalities, as being the closest level to affected citizens, 
should be given recognition in their decision-making.80 In so doing, the SCC applied the 
language of the Constitution as a “living tree”81 that must be “tailored to the changing political 
and cultural realities of Canadian society,” and “continually be reassessed in light of the 
fundamental values it was designed to serve.”82 Constitutional doctrines are thus used to balance 
the overlap of rules made by governments, reconcile diversity, and ensure sufficient 
predictability in the operation of powers.83 The principle of co-operative federalism decries 
having “watertight compartments” within which governments may act, leaving an important role 
for municipalities as stewards of the local community.84   
 
 
78 R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 SCR 472, 2002 SCC 14 (CanLII) at para. 17. 
79 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Canadian Western 
Bank”] at para. 22-23. 
80 Toronto (City) v. Goldlist Properties Inc., 2002 CanLII 62445 (ON SCDC) at para. 35. 
81 Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1929 CanLII 438 (UK JCPC), [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See e.g. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 79; Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, 1982 CanLII 55 
(SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, 2001 SCC 
67 (CanLII), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113; OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), 1987 CanLII 71 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 
2). 
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As explained by the SCC, co-operative federalism incorporates a number of doctrines, including 
subsidiarity, which serve as an important component in the interpretation of municipal action.85 
The principle of subsidiarity was invoked to support judicial deference to municipal decision-
making.86 The SCC first mentioned the principle of subsidiarity in Spraytech. Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé, writing for the majority in favour of a less stringent interpretation of municipal power, 
stated, “The case arises in an era in which matters of governance are often examined through the 
lens of the principle of subsidiarity. This is the proposition that law-making and implementation 
are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the 
citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to 
population diversity.”87 The SCC considers subsidiarity as a principle when interpreting 
municipal action.88 In a four-four decision on the proper application of the principle, the SCC 
held that subsidiarity operates as a principle affirming that “legislative action is to be taken by 
the government that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in the best position to 
respond to the citizen’s concerns,” but does not override the status of municipalities as creatures 
of the province.89  
 
Subsidiarity does not mandate that all governmental decisions must be taken at particular level of 
government, closest to the affected parties or not, nor does it suggest a re-reading of 
constitutional division of powers.90 As Mr. Justice LeBel cautioned in Spraytech, courts should 
not interpret a generous interpretation of municipal authority as license to “invent municipal 
authority where none exists.”91 Lower-court decisions echo Justice LeBel’s conclusion that 
municipal authority cannot be imbued absent provincial authority; while subsidiarity imports into 
 
85 Canadian Western Bank, supra note 79 at paras. 42-43 (The SCC held that interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, 
a strict interpretation of constitutional powers, is inconsistent with these constitutional doctrines. These doctrines 
and principles include the pith and substance doctrine, the double aspect doctrine, the necessarily incidental or 
ancillary doctrine, the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, the doctrine of paramountcy, and the doctrine of 
subsidiarity). 
86 Spraytech, supra note 67. 
87 Ibid. at paras. 3-4. See also Canadian Western Bank, supra note 79 at para. 45). 
88 Note that Spraytech, supra note 68did not consider whether a bylaw was passed for a municipal purpose, but 
instead focused on  whether: (1) the bylaw was implicitly authorized by an omnibus provision; and (2) the 
municipality was preempted from regulating pesticides because a provincial enactment occupied the field. There 
remains debate as to whether L’Heureux-Dubé J. considered subsidiarity in one or both of these questions. 
89 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 SCR 457 at paras. 72 and 183.  
90 Canada Post Corporation v. Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767 (CanLII) at para. 85. 
91 Spraytech, supra note 67 at 366. 
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case law respect for municipalities as governments to be seen as representative of their 
constituents, the principle does not grant authority where none exists in provincial statute.92  
 
The principle of subsidiarity, however, does provide two particularly useful tools to help 
understand municipal authority: first, it cements the view that municipalities should be 
conceptualized as democratic governments that make decisions on behalf of their citizens.93 
Second, read together with co-operative federalism, the principle asks for consistency and clarity 
in interpreting the actions of governments. Constitutional doctrines anticipate overlap in the rules 
made by governments and try to make sense of whether the rules can work together or not.94 The 
next section turns to this very question in the context of legislation, specifically examining how 
subsidiarity can help to make sense of municipal power where numerous pieces of provincial 
legislation overlap without consistency or clarity. 
 
III. Municipal authority and legislative design: The case of Toronto’s Ward Boundary 
Review 
 
In the European Union, subsidiarity is a political principle, invoked to elaborate the basic 
political character of municipalities.95 The EU application includes legislative provisions that 
empower municipalities, in contrast to Canada, where subsidiarity has been invoked by the 
courts. However, while the courts have introduced principles to help guide determinations of 
municipal authority, practical questions remain as to the extent municipalities can act given an 
overlap of provincial legislation that can complicate municipal authority.  
 
Municipal authority and legislative design 
 
 
92 See e.g. Friends of Lansdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273 (CanLII), para. 14; Ontario Restaurant 
Hotel & Motel Association v. Toronto, 2005 CanLII 36152 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 4268 (C.A.), para. 3; 
Spraytech, supra note 68 at paras. 21 and 26; Wainfleet Wind Energy Inc. v. The Corporation of the Township of 
Wainfleet [2013] O.J. No. 1744; Eng v Toronto, 2012 ONSC 6818; Madger v. Ford, 2013 ONSC 263, 2013 
CarswellOnt 387, 113 O.R. (3d), add’l reasons 2013 CarswellOnt 3752. 
93 Makuch et al., supra note 5 at 110. 
94 Edwards, supra note 81. 
95 Levi & Valverde, supra note 4 at 416 and 424-25. 
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Alongside judicial decisions, provincial legislation has modified the scope of municipal authority 
across the country. As C.J. Williams and John Mascarin state: “[W]hile the old prescriptive 
model has not totally been eradicated, the new statute signifies a willingness on the part of the 
province to provide local government with greater autonomy, latitude and flexibility, which of 
course has been balanced by provincial control mechanisms, the most obvious of which is the 
rampant regulation-making authority incorporated throughout the legislation.”96 The authors 
suggest that the legislative changes aren’t revolutionary, but are “a significant step in the right 
direction for municipalities by replacing the concept of prescriptive delegation with a new model 
based on broad and flexible grants of authority that are balanced with various control measures 
to ensure public accessibility and participation as well as municipal accountability and 
transparency.”97 Over the last two decades, provinces across the country have given more 
expansive powers to large municipalities, including more options for raising revenue98 and in 
relation to housing.99 
 
Figure 1 - Inventory of Laws and Rules 
 
 
96 C.J. Williams & John Mascarin, Ontario Municipal Act 2001 and Commentary (Toronto: Butterworth’s Canada 
Ltd., 2002), at 40-41. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Municipal Government Act, RSO 1990, Ch M-26. 
99 Charter of Ville de Montréal, RSO 2000, c. 56, Sch. I, Ch C-11.4. 
Federal
Constitution Act; Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms
Municipal 
Official Plan; bylaws, 
including the procedural 
and  zoning bylaws; 
staff reports; policies
Provincial
City of Toronto Act, 
2006; Planning Act; 
The Local Planning and 
Appeals Tribunal Act; 
and numerous other 
pieces of legislation
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But, in practice, Canadian cities are subject to numerous restrictions, ranging from the 
mechanisms it may use to raise revenue to the levies of tow truck drivers.100 Figure 1 provides a 
detailed inventory of the laws and institutions applicable to Toronto’s legal authority.101 This 
image illustrates the complex overlapping of rules that govern municipal jurisdiction. As 
interpreted by the courts, provinces have broad authority to enact legislation that affects 
municipalities, especially when it comes to the organization of municipal institutions. In 
Toronto, for example, the Province of Ontario introduced city-specific legislation called the City 
of Toronto Act, 2006102 that gave the city more expansive powers to self-govern in matters within 
its jurisdiction, including section 8, which grants broad discretion to the city to pass laws related 
to “general health and safety.”103 Although the City of Toronto Act, 2006 has been likened to the 
home rule status of some American cities, which gives jurisdiction over areas of responsibility 
such as education, zoning, and planning, Toronto’s powers fall well short of those and the 
province has retained its power to override the municipality’s decisions.104  
 
Ontario has also introduced numerous other pieces of legislation that impact the decision-making 
powers of local governments, including the Planning Act,105 the Ontario Municipal Board Act,106 
the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act,107 the Municipal Elections Act, 1996,108 and the Municipal 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act109 to name a few. This overlap of 
legislation complicates the actions that municipalities may take.110 I suggest that the principle of 
subsidiary can and should assist us with the normative and theoretical development of 
 
100 City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 11, Sched. A at s. 93(1). 
101  Valverde, supra note 14 at 21 and 28 (the visual representation is an adaptation of Valverde’s “legal inventory of 
laws,” which aims to provide an overview of the “basic legal architecture” engaged in particular disputes). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Friends of Landsdowne Inc. v. Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273. 
104 Levi & Valverde, supra note 4 at 454-55. 
105  R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13. 
106 R.S.O. 1990, c. O.28. Please note that at the time of writing, the Province of Ontario had recently replaced the 
Act with Bill 139, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act. This Act would have any effect on matters related to 
municipal ward boundaries and, therefore, the analysis in this paper. 
107 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50. 
108 S.O. 1996, c. 32. 
109 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56. 
110 While not analyzed in this paper, it is worthwhile to note that provincial deference to municipalities has been 
inconsistently applied across the country: at times, the province refuses to endorse municipal decisions (See e.g. 
Robert Benzie, “Kathleen Wynne Stopping John Tory’s Plan For Tolls On DVP, Gardiner” The Toronto Star (26 January 
2017); other times it defers to them entirely (Adrian Morrow, “Ontario Minister says stripping Ford of mayoralty powers 
was legal, appropriate” The Globe and Mail (19 November 2013)). 
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understanding municipal power and autonomy. The application of operative subsidiarity asks 
how applicable legislative acts, working together, act to ensure consistency in the articulation of 
the municipal role. I assert that operative subsidiarity should act as a tool of interpretation at the 
provincial level in setting out the power of a municipality to act within a policy area. The next 
section outlines the case study of Toronto’s ward boundary review to explain how the notion of 
operative subsidiarity can be used to clarify municipal authority in Canada. 
 
Municipal Ward Boundary Reviews 
 
Canada does not have a country-wide approach to the timing or process of electoral boundary 
reviews, other than at the federal level. Every ten years, federal commissions are established in 
each of Canada’s ten provinces to recommend changes to electoral boundaries. The commissions 
are independent bodies and make final decisions as to federal electoral boundaries, with 
ministers of Parliament and others taking part in the process equally as consulted parties.111 The 
province’s chief justice appoints a judge to chair the commission, and the Speaker of the House 
of Commons appoints the other two members from among the province’s residents. The 
commissions are “radically” decentralized, with each of the ten commissions operating 
independently.112 After engaging in a public consultation process, each commission submits a 
report on what it considered in revising the boundaries and proposing a revised electoral map to 
the House of Commons. Each commission then considers any objections and recommendations 
from Members of Parliament and prepares a final report, which outlines the final electoral 
boundaries for the respective province. The process is set out in the Electoral Boundaries 
Readjustment Act,113 which was introduced to address problems associated with electoral 
redistribution in Canada, such as the tendency for the exercise to be overly partisan and the 
frequent discrepancies in the geographic size and population of constituencies at the federal 
level.114  
 
111 City Clerk and City Solicitor, Staff Report to City Council: Petition to redivide ward boundaries, City of Toronto 
(2013), online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cc/bgrd/backgroundfile-60165.pdf>. 
112 Ron Levy, “Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena” (2008) 53 R.D. 
McGill 1, online: <http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/8981234-Levy.pdf> at 10. 
113 Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, ss. 4-6. 
114 Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc., The Davidson Group Inc., and Thomas Ostler, Toronto 
ward boundary review: background research report (2014). 
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In contrast, the rules relating to boundary reviews in municipalities differ strongly by 
jurisdiction. For example, in London (Ontario), staff are required to review ward populations 
each term; in Halifax, wards are considered every eight years. Ontario municipalities have 
purportedly broad discretion to determine the number of wards or electoral districts that they 
wish to have within their municipal boundaries. When COTA was enacted, and until legislative 
changes were introduced in 2018, Toronto was given authority with respect to establishing, 
changing or dissolving wards. COTA clarified this power in section 128(1), where it states: 
“Without limiting sections 7 and 8, those sections authorize the City to divide or redivide the 
City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards” and even eliminate wards altogether. The City 
then – like other Ontario municipalities now – was empowered to determine its manner of 
representation, whether through the election of councillors based on ward, elected at-large, or 
some combination of the two. However, a closer look reveals constraints and impediments to the 
exercise of this power, notwithstanding the purported freedom given to the city to regulate this 
aspect of their affairs. 
 
The City’s authority over its system of representation is dramatically tempered by other rules. 
First, COTA empowers 500 electors in the City of Toronto to petition City Council to pass a 
bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards or dissolving existing wards.115 If the City does 
not pass a bylaw within 90 days after receiving the petition, any of the electors may apply to the 
Local Planning Appeals Tribunal (LPAT), known until 2018 as the Ontario Municipal Board 
(OMB), upon which the LPAT may hear the application and make an order.116 Ironically, city 
staff estimate that the timeline required for the introduction of new ward boundaries is at least 
two years, far more than the 90 days prescribed in the Act.117 This means that while the process 
for conducting a ward boundary review is long and complex, with years of work and numerous 
 
115 City of Toronto Act, 2006, supra note 19 at s. 129(3) defines “elector” as “a person whose name appears on the 
voters’ list, as amended up until the close of voting on voting day, for the last regular election preceding a petition 
being presented to council under subsection (1).” 
116 In 2018, the Province of Ontario enacted the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 23, Sched. 
1, which changes the name and certain practices and procedures of the OMB. The new act does not address ward 
boundary review processes although does increase deference to City Council decisions. To the date of publication, 
there have been no considerations by the LPAT of municipal WBR changes. Note that a fulsome application of these 
changes to WBR processes is not considered in this article. 
117 City Manager. “A ward boundary review for Toronto,” Staff Report to Executive Committee (2013), online: 
<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-58333.pdf> at 4.  
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required rounds of public consultation, when Toronto undertook its WBR it could be appealed to 
and overturned by the OMB.118 Second, while neither COTA nor the city’s procedural bylaw set 
out the process that must be followed to designate new ward boundaries, the legislation does 
require that the powers of the City be exercised by City Council.119 A strict reading of the 
legislation implies that an independent body like the federal commission would not be able to 
make the final decision on the placement of ward boundaries, although the City has never tried 
nor tested this approach.  
 
Third, municipalities are subject to quasi-judicial constraints relating to boundary-making. As 
political scientist Andrew Sancton notes, there are no SCC decisions that apply to the drawing of 
municipal boundaries and, indeed, the courts have specifically provided that the principles that 
apply to the federal and provincial governments do not apply to municipalities.120 In practice, as 
a result of OMB pronouncements, Ontario municipalities have observed the common-law 
requirements related to electoral districts set out in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada case, 
Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), known colloquially as the “Carter 
decision.”121 This case considered the meaning of the “right to vote” in section 3 of Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 3 grants every citizen the right to “vote in an election of 
members of the House of Commons or a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership 
therein.” The case was brought by lawyer and resident Rogers Carter, who observed that the 
electoral boundaries (or ridings) approved in the Province of Saskatchewan led to significant 
deviations in population across the province. The result was that, “a single vote in the smaller 
riding carried 63.5% more electoral weight than a single vote in the larger riding.”122 
 
In affirming that there may be population differences across ridings, the SCC clarified that voter 
parity was the only measure to assess effective representation, but not the only criterion by which 
boundaries should be evaluated. In considering electoral boundaries, the first criterion is that 
 
118 Ibid. at 3. 
119 City of Toronto Act, 2006, supra note 101 at s. 132. 
120 Andrew Sancton, “Commentary” in J. Courtney, P. MacKinnon, and D. E. Smith (Eds.), Drawing Boundaries: 
Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Boundaries (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1992). 
121 Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.) [1991] 2 SCR 158. 
122 David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and Courts: Practices, Principles and Problems” (1994) 39 
McGill L.J. 224 at 227. 
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approximately the same numbers of voters are represented in each electoral area, a criterion 
known as “voter parity.” However, to achieve “effective representation,” other criteria are also 
important, namely geography, community history, community interests, minority representation, 
and other factors.123 These other criteria justify a departure from strict voter parity; however, the 
courts have said that the population of each electoral district should not deviate by more than 25 
percent. The result is that provincial authority effectively empowers the LPAT or, at the time of 
Toronto’s WBR, the OMB, to decide whether municipalities have fulfilled the SCC principles. 
However, unlike the courts, quasi-judicial decisions do not follow stare decisis, meaning that 
adjudicators are not bound by previous LPAT or OMB decisions. Therefore, for any 
municipality undertaking a ward boundary review, it is important to navigate the zig-zaggy 
compendium of past cases. Because LPAT or OMB decisions are not binding on subsequent 
hearings, there is no single set of prescribed rules that municipalities must follow to prevent the 
tribunal from overturning a ward boundary review.  
 
Any WBR process in Ontario is a legal minefield, with broad principles but no clear rules 
guiding potential for residents to appeal proposed boundaries to the LPAT. Contestations to the 
meaning of the term “communities of interest” illustrate the degree to which the OMB intervened 
in ward boundary reviews in the past. For example, in Kingston’s 2013 ward boundary review 
process, City Council’s decision was appealed to the OMB on the basis that it did not provide 
effective representation, in part because the bylaw failed to recognize “communities of interest” 
by splitting up an area represented by a single neighbourhood association.124 The OMB sided 
with the appellant and amended the bylaw to account for the Syndenham Neighbourhood 
Association.125 In Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations were the “communities of 
interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.126 So, recognition of neighbourhoods as 
“communities of interest” is important to the OMB, but there are no specific guidelines offered, 
nor adherence to a municipality’s interpretation of the term. Likewise, the OMB has stated that 
ward boundary decisions will be amended or repealed only if there is a compelling reason to do 
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so.127 But, in practice, the OMB has overturned ward boundary reviews in cities such as Ottawa -
- after several years of community consultations, reports, and decision-making -- only to have the 
city restart the process or accept the OMB’s ward design.128  
 
Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review 
 
Wards are deeply entrenched in the governance models of most Canadian municipalities, 
including Toronto, as vehicles for representative democracy. The 2013 ward boundary review 
was Toronto’s first municipal-led ward boundary review since the city’s amalgamation in 1998. 
When the review began, the populations of Toronto’s wards were widely unequal, with some 
wards having twice the population of others.129 For example, ward 18 (in the former City of 
Toronto) and ward 29 (in the former Borough of East York) each contained fewer than 45,000 
residents, approximately half of the population of ward 23 (in the former City of North York), 
which had almost 90,000 residents. 
 
In June 2013, City Council approved a WBR process.130 A strong impetus for the review was 
that the dangerously low threshold of having 500 citizens petition City Council to pass a bylaw 
dividing or redividing the city into wards or dissolving existing wards, upon the OMB could hear 
and make an order imposing new boundaries.131 COTA also requires that City Council must 
make final decisions on all but a handful of delegated powers. To City staff, this meant that the 
decision on ward boundaries could not be delegated to an independent commission akin to the 
federal process. Instead, City staff recommended that consultants be retained to conduct the 
review, independent from City staff and councillors. The objective was to keep the process at 
arm’s-length from the City Manager’s Office, who would oversee the WBR, while the 
consultants would make the final recommendations. Careful attention was placed on avoiding 
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language that would limit the consultants’ options, in particular by setting out in advance the 
number of wards, which was the factor that led to the OMB’s rejection of Ottawa’s WBR a few 
years earlier.132   
 
COTA constrained Toronto’s ability to design a WBR that emulated the federal government’s 
arm’s length process given COTA’s limits to delegation. As a result, councillors played an 
especially important role in the WBR. The WBR process was designed by staff and approved by 
the Executive Committee and City Council. Staff recommended a process that involved hiring 
external consultants to develop a set of recommendations, following extensive public and 
stakeholder consultations, which would then go to Executive Committee and City Council for 
approval.133 Staff advised councillors that the OMB could overturn City Council’s WBR process 
and decision if the review were overly limited or prescribed, so the hope was that this fear would 
further protect the process from undue political influence.134 City councillors were interviewed 
by the consultations at the start of the process, following the designation of the ward boundary 
options, and again towards the end of the review process.135 In the first consultation stage, the 
consultants individually interviewed all 44 members of the 2010-2014 City Council and seven 
new 2014-2018 Members of Council to solicit their perspective on the issues related to the 
current Toronto ward configuration.136 In stage 2, the consultants had meetings with 42 members 
of Council and three members of the Mayor’s staff.  
 
In short, the WBR illustrated a top-down, constrained process. City councillors were the ultimate 
decision-makers both in the final decision and in the creation of the process, despite their heavy 
involvement in the consultation process.137 Under one section of COTA, Toronto has full power 
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to steward the WBR process; as a result of another, Toronto could introduce a model led by an 
independent commission, as adopted at the federal level. The OMB has the power to step in and 
determine ward boundaries based on the application of 500 electors, with the quasi-tribunal’s 
decisions offering little guidance on how to construct a process free of scrutiny. Thus, the City of 
Toronto had to craft its process to fit within the narrow confines of legislative constraints, with a 
disproportionately privileged role for councillors. In the end, Toronto’s deliberate, careful 
process succeeded and was upheld by the OMB on appeal, based on the appropriate application 
of the Carter decision, and in particular the “effective representation” of the resulting 47 
wards.138 In its 2-1 decision on December 15, 2017, the OMB upheld Toronto’s WBR, stating 
that, “[Toronto’s] ward structure delineated in the By-laws provides for effective representation 
and corrects the current population imbalance amongst the existing 44 wards.  The decision 
made by Council to adopt the By-laws was defensible, fair and reasonable.”139 
 
Provincial override of Toronto’s ward boundaries 
 
Toronto’s election period for the statutorily scheduled municipal election commenced on May 1, 
2018.140 Thousands of candidates signed up in the first two months of the race, with a record 
number of historically marginalized vying for councillor positions.141 On June 7, 2018, the 
Conservative party won a majority of seats in the provincial legislature and Doug Ford, a 
previous Toronto councillor, became the premier. The next month, Premier Ford announced that 
one of the first acts of the new government would be the reduction in the number of City of 
Toronto wards from 47 to 25, and the boundaries would match those of the federal electoral 
districts. Toronto’s mayor had a tepid response to the provincial decision.142 Bill 5, The Better 
Local Government Act, was enacted in law on August 14, 2018 and, as promised, amended the 
City of Toronto Act, 2006 by reducing the size of city council to 25.143 Several candidates for city 
council, mainly women and historically marginalized people, challenged Bill 5, as did the City of 
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Toronto, once empowered to do so by City Council.144 On September 10, 2018, Superior Court 
Justice Edward Belobaba found that Bill 5 “substantially interfered with both the candidate’s and 
the voter’s right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” and could not be saved under s. 1.145 In a whirlwind decision, 
following the government’s threat that they would invoke the notwithstanding clause to override 
Justice Belobaba’s decision, the Court of Appeal later granted the Province of Ontario’s request 
for a stay, with the result that the election moved forward under a 25-ward model.146  
 
The appeal of Justice Belobaba’s decision is pending, with numerous grounds of appeal possible 
outside of Charter section 2(b), including unwritten constitutional principles and the applicability 
of Charter section 3 to municipalities.147 Amongst the issues that may be considered by the 
courts is the question of subsidiarity. In particular, how the notion of municipalities as “creatures 
of the province” nests with the increasing amount of deference granted to local governments as 
democratic bodies and their integral role as actors within the principle of cooperative federalism. 
An appellate decision on the merits may also resolve critical questions of subsidiarity in the 
drawing of electoral boundaries. If so, the court could further resolve decades of jurisprudence 
that both asserts a co-operative federalism that includes a respectful role for municipalities and 
upholds provincial authority over municipalities. 
 
Operative subsidiarity and municipal ward boundaries 
 
What would an application of the principle of subsidiary mean for the WBR process and for 
municipal authority more broadly? The Constitution Act articulates that the powers of 
municipalities fall within the responsibility of the province. Provinces can set out a prescriptive, 
hierarchical model or grant broad powers to municipalities to make decisions within their 
spheres of jurisdiction.148 As Blank writes, “it is precisely the fact that federalism as a principle 
has nothing to say about cities that causes the neglect of constitutional protection to cities in most 
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federal constitutions.”149 By contrast, under the principle of subsidiarity, cities are important 
because of their unique location of human association. The bottom line is that it is human 
connection felt at the localized level that has reinforced the importance of municipal forms of 
government.150 The SCC has invoked subsidiarity alongside the principle of co-operative 
federalism, which recognizes municipalities as distinct governments that are empowered to act 
on behalf of their citizens.  
 
However, the actual powers of municipalities are complicated by the overlap of provincial 
legislation, which blurs the scale at which decisions are to be made. Even before the provincial 
government introduced Bill 5, Toronto’s WBR process proceeded both under COTA’s 
constraints and in fear of OMB appeal. At the time of the WBR, COTA purportedly gave full 
autonomy to Toronto to decide its ward boundary review process, yet the province also granted 
the OMB the power to override municipal ward decisions and substitute its own version. The 
construct of empowerment is significantly limited, calling into question how much power the 
city actually has. The WBR process was designed to comply with provincial laws that forced the 
city to design a careful process that could withstand OMB scrutiny, and yet limited Toronto’s 
capacity to adopt a process that was arms-length from City Council, such as the federal 
commission model, which seeks to prevent gerrymandering. The result in Toronto was a WBR 
process that heavily relied on the input and buy-in of councillors, calling into question how 
independent the decision was from the self-interested will of these elected actors. This 
unintended consequence cannot possibly be what the province had in mind. Bill 5 unseated 
Toronto as having a say over this aspect its governance model overall, notwithstanding the 
crucial role of wards in local governance. 
 
A framework of operative subsidiarity would help to clarify the interpretation of municipal 
authority. Operative subsidiarity draws attention to the question of consistency in scale and 
jurisdiction. In the context of ward boundaries, for example, Bill 5 is not a single provincial bill 
that overrides the City of Toronto’s decision in the creation of its electoral districts. Instead, it is 
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part of a larger narrative of the provincial government’s lack of comfort in municipalities as 
having full autonomy in the drawing of ward boundaries. Operative subsidiarity illuminates that 
Toronto was always constrained, through various legal instruments, in having full authority to 
create its wards, based on COTA provisions and the oversight function of the OMB. Seen 
through the lens of operative subsidiarity, the City of Toronto had to maneuver amongst various 
legislative provisions, impacting both the process and outcome. 
 
Operative subsidiarity would improve consistency and clarity in municipal legislation. There are 
two plausible routes in its application. First, operative subsidiarity, as a tool of legislative design, 
would require provinces to determine how various pieces of legislation work together to 
empower local governments. In the context of the WBR, prior to the enactment of Bill 5, where 
applications of the Charter and overlapping pieces of legislation muddle the autonomy 
purportedly granted by the province, municipalities could focus their query on how such laws are 
meant to co-exist. If enacted by the province as an interpretation tool, this would facilitate the 
interpretation of current enabling statutes in favour of fulsome municipality authority. Second, 
operative subsidiarity could be adopted as a guiding principle for quasi-judicial interpretation of 
municipal action. Like subsidiarity, it could be applied alongside other constitutional principles 
to recognize municipalities as distinct governments representative of their constituents in 




This paper contributes to the conversation on how the principle of subsidiarity can be 
operationalized when provinces craft municipal authority. It does not seek to offer an ambitious 
theory of municipal authority, but, instead, offers a modest lens upon which provincial laws 
concerning local power can be streamlined for consistency. As Berman writes, “The line-
drawing problems are potentially difficult and often politically contested, but even just the habits 
of mind generated by thinking in terms of subsidiarity can help ensure that lawmaking 
communities at least take into account other potentially relevant lawmaking communities.”151 
Kong agrees, stating that the acknowledgement of other forms of government is the principle 
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strength of subsidiarity.152 Thus, consideration of the municipal scale is the way in which 
subsidiarity can be operationalized; in particular, by invoking the principle to understand the 
implications of multiple laws that may constrain the effective policy-making power of local 
governments.  
 
Operative subsidiarity looks first to the matter to be addressed and then designs how that scale 
can be empowered to act.153 The municipality may not in fact be the right scale. The benefit, 
however, is to design a model that makes sense, is consistent, and which achieves legitimacy.154 
Operative subsidiarity provides a workable basis for legislative design. In the case of the WBR, 
operative subsidiarity offers a means of observing the patchwork of legislation that seems to 
simultaneously grant power yet undermines municipal autonomy, and which limits the extent to 
which the city may devise a WBR approach that can achieve policy aims in an accountable 
process. Instead, the province should start by querying the right scale of authority, then re-
imagining electoral design policy with clear, enabling legislation. Without it, we are left with a 
WBR process – and municipal policy generally - that does not achieve the fundamental objective 
of representative democracy and uncertainty in respect of municipal authority.  
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